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Abstract
The present article provides a unied explanation for several phenomena related
to advertising by rms. (i) Advertising without repeat purchase of the prod-
uct, (ii) advertising from established brands, or post-introductory, (iii) simul-
taneous advertising from low and high quality rms, (iv) its persistence and
pro-cyclicality. The explanation is original because it rests upon oligopolistic in-
teraction. The analysis hinges upon two fundamental results. The rst is that
advertising allows separation when a signal via prices only does not. The sec-
ond is that purely dissipative advertising can be used to strategically deter entry.
Hence, a link is established between entry deterrence and signaling.
Keywords: Advertising, signaling, entry deterrence, imperfect information,
oligopoly, vertical dierentiation.
1. Introduction
The1 explanation of advertising by Nelson [1974] is well known. In a context
where consumers repeatedly purchase an experience good|namely one of a qual-
ity that can be learned only after purchase|apparently wasteful advertising cam-
paigns induce rational consumers to realize that the advertised brands sell a su-
perior product. Consumers would not re-purchase the good after a rst trial if
it were not of good quality, and the introductory advertising costs could not be
recovered in subsequent periods.
Nelson arguments|that apply to any form of wasteful expenses by rms and
not just to advertising|rest on repeat purchase. Along those lines several authors
have developed rigorous models to scrutinize the validity of Nelsonian theories
(see among others Milgrom and Roberts [1986], Schmalensee [1982]; see also
Martin [1994] for a recent survey). The limitation in the Nelsonian theory is that
it can account only for introductory advertising which is terminated after the
product becomes known. Moreover, most of the literature considers the strategic
interaction among one rm and the population of consumers. Kihlstrom and
Riordan [1984] represent an exception since they consider a perfectly competitive
industry with free entry, where rms are price-takers. They obtain the result
that advertising equilibria can arise also when the interaction among rms and
consumers is not repeated, provided the high quality rms have lower variable
costs than their low quality rivals.
There seems to lack a unied theory which can explain several phenomena
related to advertising.
First, advertising or other wasteful and observable selling expenses are com-
mon in markets where consumption has a transient nature. Think for instance
to the owners of restaurants that crowd some touristic areas (this example is also
in Tirole [1989]), who invest sometimes considerable sums in luxurious settings,
silver cutlery, number of waiters, and the like, although they do not expect to
receive the same customers repeatedly. One may observe that some restaurants
will spend money on these items and others will not. However, a theory based
on repeat purchase cannot assign an informative role to these expenditures.
1C-D. Fluet, Departement des Sciences Economiques, University of Quebec at Montreal, CP
8888 Succ.A, Montreal -Quebec- (Canada), H3C 3P8. Paolo G. Garella, Dipartimento di Scienze
Economiche, Strada Maggiore 45, 40123 Bologna (Italy), e-mail garella@boph01.cineca.it.We
wish to thank participants in workshops at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, I.G.I.E.R.
(Milano), and Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore). F. Forges provided comments on an
earlier version but does not share any responsibility on the remaining errors. A suggestion by
Jacques Robert was particularly useful at an earlier stage of the paper. The nancial support
from the Quebec Fund FCAR is gratefully aknowledged.
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Second, as a cursory look at television campaigns may conrm, rms with
brands of long-established reputation also spend considerable sums on advertis-
ing. This phenomenon cannot be explained by Nelsonian theories, unless one
admits a constant inow of new consumers at each period who are unaware of
the quality of the brand being advertised and who enter a repeat purchase pro-
cess. Another way out would be to assume that consumers do not have perfect
recall|or that the characteristics of the products on the market change fast while
purchases happen infrequently2. It seems dicult to accept the idea however that
the magnitude of this inow be large enough to justify the large stream over time
of advertising expenditures that one observes. Similarly, this type of advertising
is not encompassed by the explanation in Kihlstrom and Riordan since, although
they do not assume repeat purchase, rms need to advertise only in the intro-
ductory phase.
Third, the empirical literature (as well as some non-signal theories of advertis-
ing like Dorfman and Steiner[1954] ) had long since noted the relative constancy
of the advertising-sales ratio of rms over time (see for instance Schmalensee
[1972]). This means in particular that advertising varies pro-cyclically.
Fourth, in various markets where rms of higher quality compete against rivals
of lower quality, advertising by low quality rms is conspicuous and sometimes it
compares to that of the high quality rms.
The explanation provided in the present paper encompasses all these four
types of advertising and it therefore enlarges the quota of advertising expendi-
tures that can be attributed to a signaling eort by rms. Furthermore, quite
surprisingly, the explanation we provide conrms an old idea, namely that high
advertising expenditures can be used as a strategic entry barrier. It is worth
emphasizing that the entry preventing attribute of advertising is derived in the
present paper without recurring to ad hoc assumptions about the inuence of
advertising on consumers' tastes.
The model below abandons the repeat purchase (which however could be rein-
troduced at no cost) and the one-rm assumptions. It explicitly considers the
problem of nding separating instruments for the case where two rms compete
on the same market. None of these two rms has an established reputation but it
can be of high or of low quality; therefore the consumers are confronted with the
problem of interpreting the price-advertising strategies of both rms at the same
time. Interesting situations may arise that do not appear in the monopoly case.
For instance, a rm may try and exploit the consumers imperfect information
by copying the strategy adopted by its rival. This type of mimicking behavior
is rather dierent from the one to which the signaling literature in economics is
used: in our case, in fact, it is quite obvious that if two rms send the same
signal (whether along or outside the equilibrium path) then the consumers must
attribute them the same probability of being of a given type. In other words
2We thank Guido Candela for drawing our attention to this case.
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each rm is aware that the strategy it plays is liable to aect the beliefs that the
uninformed party, here the consumers, holds about the other rm's type as well
as of its own type.
This feature of beliefs does not depend on the number of informed parties|it
is evident that in the job market game of Spence [1973] there are many workers
but the beliefs of the employer on the type of worker Smith do not take into
account what worker Jones has spent on education3. It depends rather on the
property that the payo (here the prots) of an informed player depends upon
what the other player does (e.g. its pricing behavior), and on the fact that this
reciprocal dependence is common knowledge to all players.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, in Section 2, the problem with one rm
only is introduced and the notation established. The main reason for Section
2 rests not upon its novelty but on the need to briey clarify why in the ab-
sence of repeat purchase the monopoly case is insucient to explain any form of
advertising, and to pave the way for the remaining Sections.
Section 3, then, constitutes the core of the paper. Two rms compete, each
being of one among two possible types, each rm knows its type and that of the
competitor while consumers do not observe the realized state of Nature but only
the strategies played by the rms. On the basis of this observation consumers
form their beliefs. The purpose of the Section is that of deriving a characterization
of separating equilibria that does not depend on the belief system adopted by
consumers. As a method, the approach consists of writing down two necessary
conditions that the strategies played by the two rms must satisfy in the states of
Nature when their qualities dier: these simply say that neither rm must nd it
protable to mimic exactly the behavior of the rival when their types dier. Only
using these two conditions it is shown that there are cases in which a separating
equilibrium, if it exists, must involve the use of advertising by the high quality
rm if the quality types dier. The rst task of the present research is therefore
accomplished in Section 3, since an explanation is provided for advertising that
does not impinge on repeat purchase.
The issue of existence of separating equilibria is solved in Appendix 2, which,
however, does not develop a complete typology of possible belief systems since
this is irrelevant for our results and it would lead us astray from the non-technical
issues that motivate the analysis.
In Section 4, the idea that entry may be deterred through advertising is
examined using the results of Section 3. The Section presents an extension of
the basic model obtained introducing the possibility that the duopoly market
structure be contestable by a rm which can also be of two types: low and
"very low", and which can mimic the behavior of a low quality. A true low-
3Similarly, if the industry is perfectly competitive a rm cannot aect with its behavior the
beliefs that consumers hold about the types of the other rms. Khilstrom and Riordan [1984]
model therefore does not share this feature.
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quality rm must then also protect its position, and it can do so only through
advertising. Interestingly, this type of advertising does not serve to separate from
existing rms, but from potential entrants, and therefore where observed it may
be erroneously ascribed to other reasons not depending on imperfect information
about quality. This type of advertising persists over time as long as the threat by
lower quality rms persists, and it varies in the same direction as demand varies,
namely it varies pro-cyclically.
Our explanation of the entry barrier attribute of advertising is not based upon
the eects on consumers' tastes, as advertising is here purely dissipative. It is
interesting to note that in an article on limit pricing and advertising Bagwell
and Ramey [1988] used price-advertising couples as informative strategies by an
incumbent to signal its cost of production to an entrant. They found that purely
dissipative advertising could not be used as an entry barrier.
Other models (of repeat-purchase) that are related to the study of experience
goods are the reputation models like Klein and Leer [1981] and Shapiro [1983],
based on the importance of quality premia for the inducement to a monopolist
to introduce a high quality instead of a low one (see also Riordan [1986]). In
this respect our analysis also has some consequences, in spite of the assumption
we make that the types of the rms are chosen by Nature. Where rms cannot
rely on repeat purchase, in fact, a high quality can be introduced only if it can
separate from the low qualities.
2. Monopoly in the Absence of Repeat-Purchase
The main implications of the analysis can be derived via a simple example, already
used for the monopoly case by Bagwell and Riordan [1991], and here rearranged,
where needed, to introduce a vertically dierentiated duopoly4.
Consider a market where a monopolist sells a good that can be of quality H
or L. Unit production costs are c for the high quality and 0 for the low quality.
There are no xed costs of production, although the monopolist can voluntarily
add a discretionary amount of xed cost, a; in the form of wasteful advertising
campaigns. Each consumer buys either one unit or none. If the good is of quality
H the consumer's utility after purchase is
uH = v +m  pH (2.1)
4Although several examples exist (see Gabszewicz and Thisse[1979] seminal paper, and
Shaked and Sutton [1981]) we do not have yet a general theory of vertical dierentiation in
oligoply under complete information. The authors have worked out a set of necessary conditions
for a duopoly to be dened as vertically dierentiated, and have checked that the main charac-
ter of the analysis can be preserved in that more general set-up. The exposition, however, then
becomes mingled to conceptual issues pertaining to the full information generalization of the
vertical dierentiation models that do not add any useful insights while the dierence between
our explanation of advertising and the traditional one becomes unclear.
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where v is a positive constant, pH is the price paid to the seller, and m is a
taste parameter, ranging in the unit interval [0; 1], uniformly distributed over
this range so that the consumers population has unit mass. If a consumer does
not buy her utility is zero. The consumer that is indierent between buying or
not a high quality product has taste parameter m = pH   v. The demand to the
monopolist of high quality under perfect information is then
DH (pH) = min[1 + v   pH ; 1]
if 1 + v  pH , and DH = 0 if 1 + v  pH .
If the good is of low quality, then utility is assumed to be invariant with m
and to be given by
uL = v   pL: (2.2)
Therefore demand to the monopolist of low quality under perfect information is
DL = 1 if v  pL, and DL = 0 if v < pH .
The perfect information prices are pmH = max f(1 + v + c)=2; vg and p
m
L = v
for the high and the low quality respectively. The case where (1 + v + c)=2  v
is of no interest since then the monopolist has no incentive to separate when
her quality is H. Eliminating this case, then, the full information prots are
respectively given by mH = [(1 + v   c)=2]
2 and mL = v.
Under imperfect information, assume that consumers know that the monop-
olist may be of one of the two qualities, so that there are only two possible states
of Nature, denoted by (H) and (L). Let  denote a couple (p; a) of price and ad-
vertising used by the monopolist. For any observation of  the consumers form a
belief about the product quality. More precisely a belief is dened as a function
b() indicating the probability that the product is of high quality. Then, given a
particular price and advertising combination chosen by the rm, the consumer's
expected utility is u() = b()(v +m  p) + (1  b())(v  p), with u() = uH if
b() = 1 and u() = uL if b() = 0.
A separating equilibrium, loosely speaking, is constituted by strategies and
beliefs with the property that , say, is played if the state is H, and L, say, is
played if the state is L, and the beliefs are such that no deviation from these strat-
egy prescription is protable. It is well known that application of the elimination
of dominated strategies implies that at a separating equilibrium L = (pmL ; 0), and
we shall not repeat the argument here (see Milgrom and Roberts 1986). This im-
plies that there are two necessary conditions for separation, they are respectively:
(i) (1 + v   p)p  a  v; (2.3)
and
(ii) (1 + v   p)(p  c)  a  v   c: (2.4)
Condition (i) states that a strategy  can be part of a separating equilibrium
only if the monopolist has no incentive to play  if its quality is low. Condition
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(ii) states that a strategy  can be part of a separating equilibrium only if the
monopolist has no incentive to deviate from the play of  to the play of (v; 0)
if the quality is high. Note that, as Milgrom and Roberts[1986] show, although
many other deviations are possible from the equilibrium prescription, the two
deviations here stated are generally regarded as crucial. In fact it is generally the
case that one can nd a system of beliefs that supports the play of  in state (H)
and of (v; 0) in state (L) if  satises the two conditions (i) and (ii).
The characterization of  is usually the focus of the analysis, since it char-
acterizes the type of signal used. In general  is not uniquely identied by the
constraints, while these rather identify a set of regions in the space of couples
(p; a) to which  must belong. In this respect the following result indicates that
the use of advertising is not essential for separation.
Proposition 1: Under monopoly if there exists a strategy  = (p; a) with a > 0,
that satises constraints (i) and (ii), then there also exists a strategy 0 = (p0; 0)
satisfying the same constraints.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Note that Proposition-1 can be interpreted as follows: the existence of a
separating equilibrium, under monopoly and in a one-shot game, does not impinge
on the possibility of advertising; in other terms, the possibility to advertise does
not enlarge the spectrum of circumstances under which separation may occur.
This however does not mean that advertising can be excluded on some game
theoretic ground because to do that one needs use of an equilibrium selection
criterion. This is done in Milgrom and Roberts[1986] who show that advertising
resists the application of standard renements criteria only if repeat purchase is
assumed, and we do not restate the argument here.
There is an economic reason, however, why advertising is not necessary: it is
more costly to signal through advertising than through price. The proof of this
statement is simple: dene a(p) = (1 + v   p)p   v. For any given price this
function gives the minimal amount of advertising that is necessary to separate.
Then, maximize the prot of the high quality monopolist with respect to price
and advertising under the constraint that a  max[0; a(p)]. This is equivalent
to maximize with respect to p the function (p) = (1 + v   p)p   a(p) over the
interval p in [0; pa] where pa is the highest root of 0 = (1 + v   p)p   v. Since
a(p) is monotone decreasing in p, and since 0(p) > 0 the prot so written is
increasing in price, so that a maximum obtains at pa with a(pa) = 0.
Saying it dierently, consider again the separation constraint (i) above. Since
advertising adds to the costs of a high quality monopoly as much as it adds to
those of a low quality it is relatively easier to imitate than a policy of high price:
the latter is more costly in terms of lost prot (unit margin times demand) for
a monopoly of low quality, who produces at a low marginal cost, than for one of
high quality, who produces at a high marginal cost.
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3. Duopoly
3.1. The structure of competition under full information
Before the study of the signaling game described in the Introduction above, it is
necessary to briey present the full information results of competition in duopoly.
Assume that the cost conditions are the same as for the monopoly case, again
without loss of generality, assume that cL = 0. Let the buyer's utility be described
by the expressions (2.1) and (2.2) above. The consumer that is indierent between
buying qualityH or L has taste parameterm(pH ; pL) = pH pL; if 0 < pH pL < 1.
Then it is easy to show that the demand to the high quality rm is the continuous
function dH(pH ; pL) described by
dH(pH ; pL) = min f1  pH +min[pL; v]; 1g ; if pH < 1 + min[pL; v] (3.1)
dH(pH ; pL) = 0 otherwise.
Note here that for any value of pL, dH(pH ; pL) = 0 for pH  2.
Similarly, demand to rm of type L is given by
dL(pH ; pL) = min fpH   pL; 1g ; if pL < pH ; (3.2)
and dL(pH ; pL) = 0 otherwise.
The two demand functions are depicted in Figure 1.
The reaction function for rm H is described by the function
^
pH= (1=2)(1 + pL + c); if max [c  1; 0]  pL  v; (3.3)
if by contrast p > v , then rm L has zero demand and rm H reaction function
consists of its monopoly price, that is
^
pH= (1=2)(1 + v + c); if pL > v:
Finally, if rm L quotes a price lower than c 1 then rm H cannot quote a price
equal to (1=2)(1 + pL+ c) as this is lower than its marginal cost, therefore we set
^
pH= c for c  1  pL.
Similarly, the reaction function for rm L is
^
pL=
pH
2
; if
pH
2
< v; (3.4)
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and it is
^
pL= v otherwise. A Nash equilibrium in prices under full information,
with both rms enjoying a positive market share5, and positive prots occurs if
the two reaction functions cross at the point (pL; p

H ) given by
(pL; p

H) =
 
2(1 + c)
3
;
(1 + c)
3
!
: (3.5)
When the crossing of the two reaction functions occurs at this point both rms
enjoy a positive market share (see Figure 2 for an example). This is possible if and
only if c and v are in the set S dened by S = f(c; v) j c 2 [0; 2]; v  (1 + c)=3g 6.
It is henceforth assumed:
Assumption 1 : (c; v) 2 S.
3.2. Necessary Conditions
To analyze the duopoly case we shall use a methodology that parallels as close as
possible the one traditionally used for the monopoly. First the necessary condi-
tions for separation shall be determined, then a characterization of the separat-
ing equilibria is derived, and nally (in an Appendix) the existence of separating
equilibria is demonstrated.
Unlike in the monopoly case the consumers observe two couples of price-
advertising strategies, one for each rm. There are four states of Nature: (L,L)
designs the state where both rm are of type L, (L,H) and (H,L) design the
states where one rm is H and the other is L, (H,H) designs the state where
both are of type H. Let ! denote the set of states that are admissible, here let
therefore be ! = f(L;L); (L;H); (H;L); (H;H)g. At the rst stage of the game
Nature chooses a state and only the two rms observe Nature's move, they then
simultaneously choose, at the second stage, their strategies (i; j) : Finally, at
the third stage, consumers form beliefs and purchase from one or the other rm.
There are at least two equivalent ways of representing beliefs. The rst assigns
to any strategy prole (i; j) played by the two rms, i and j, a four dimensional
vector of probabilities, one for each state. The second assigns to each strategy
prole an ordered couple (bi(i; j); bj(j; i)) that represents the probabilities
5We are not interested to equilibria where only one rm survives, for this reason also we
have not introduced xed costs in the cost functions. Note that in the example here treated the
low quality rm at equilibrium always enjoys a positive market share, while the high quality
rm could be out of the market if its cost is too high. It is this situation that we rule out.
6The price pL is an equilibrium price if and only if p

L  (1+c)3  v. The price of rm H is
higher than c if c < 2(1+c)
3
, i.e. if c < 2. Furthermore, since the market demand to rm H at
prices (pL; p

H) is equal to (1   ((1 + c)=3)), the condition c < 2 also guarantees that this be
positive. Whence the denition of the set S in the text.
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attributed to the event that rms i and j be the high quality rm. The equivalence
of the two representations is self evident. For our convenience we adopt the
second.
At rst sight the task of dening beliefs as a function from couples of strategies
(i; j) ( four-dimensional vectors) to couples of probabilities (bi(i; j); bj(i; j))
is formidable. Luckily it is possible to obtain results that are belief-independent,
in the sense that they apply to any system of beliefs that sustain a separating
equilibrium. This exempts us from the task of justifying the choice of a particular
structure of beliefs for the results that shall be obtained in the present Section.
Let us transform the notation slightly so that bi(i j j) denotes the proba-
bility assigned to the event that rm i is H when this rm plays i against the
play of j by rm j. The notation makes it clear that rms are symmetric in the
sense that for any , one has bi( j ) = bj( j ), i.e. that rms are assigned
the same belief when they play identical strategies7. Even if this is an obvious
property we state it formally for convenience:
Property 1: If the rms adopt identical strategies then the consumers beliefs assign
to either rm an identical probability of being of high quality.
A (fully) separating equilibrium is one where: (i) beliefs assign a unique vector
(bi(i j j); bj(i j j)) to each strategy prole; (ii) the rms play pure strategies
that lead to a dierent action prole in each state; (iii) beliefs are consistent with
the rms' strategies8. Let us proceed to the analysis of the strategies (H; L),
that must be played at a separating equilibrium when the realized state is (H,L)
or (L,H)|the strategies that are played at the other states of Nature do not
aect the characteristics of (H; L) that are discussed here.
(A) First, it must be a property of any separating equilibrium of the game
that when the state is (L,H) or (H,L) the rm of type L must not nd it
convenient to deviate, from the action L that the equilibrium prescribes,
to the use of the action H that is prescribed for the type-H rm.
(B) Second, it must be a property of any separating equilibrium that when the
state is (L,H) or (H,L) the rm of type H has no incentive to deviate from
the equilibrium prescription H and use the strategy L that is prescribed
to rm L.
7A more stringent symmetry requirement is that bi(
0 j 00) = bj(0 j 00). Although this
restriction is quite natural it is not necessary for the analysis here performed, ad it is therefore
not used.
8Note that point (i) in the denition excludes partially separating equilibria, i.e. equilibria
where some but not all states are pooled. We are not interested in partial separation here.
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Note that since the deviation in A induces symmetric beliefs b(H j H), it "jams"
the signal sent by rm H. But it does not necessarily imply that L is perceived
as H by consumers: whether on or out the equilibrium path, in fact, observing
H at both rms may not lead to the belief that with probability one the state
is (H;H).
These two properties lead, taken in turn, to two necessary conditions on the
equilibrium strategies.
For k; j 2 fH;Lg, let j(j; k; b(j j k)) denote the payo to rm of type
j when (i) playing strategy j against strategy k played by its rival of type k,
and (ii) given the induced belief on its type b(j j k).
Necessary condition A, which may be called "no-jamming condition"9 writes
as:
(A) L(H; H; b(H j H))  L(L j H ; 0):
Necessary condition (B) writes as
(B) H(L; L; b(L j L)  H(H j L; 1):
Recall again that the analysis is, for the time being, concerned with the prop-
erties of the strategies played when the state is (L,H) or (H,L) in a separating
equilibrium. These two conditions are necessary, for any given belief system im-
plying particular values of b(H j H) and b(L j L). If it is possible to show
that the choice of these two values is irrelevant for the following results then the
last inuence of beliefs on the analysis of necessary conditions (A) and (B) is
removed10.
3.3. Necessary conditions and signaling
The plan of the argument in this subsection is the following:
1) We show that condition (A) is most favorable to price-alone strategies when
b(H j H) = 0.
2) We assume b(H j H) = 0 and show that with price-alone strategies separation
cannot always obtain.
9The term signal jamming is used by Fudenberg and Tirole 1986, in a context where an
informed player may prevent another uninformed player from observing a signal .
10Note that since H and L are by denition part of a separating equilibrium they reveal
the state (H,L) or (L,H) and there is no choice but 0 or 1, as it applies, for the R.H.S in the
inequalities in (A) and (B).
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3) We analyze condition (B) and show that when separation fails through price-
alone strategies it can be obtained with a positive level of advertising expendi-
tures.
To begin with, let dene a strategy for a rm as a function that describes its
choice of action for each given state of nature|rms move simultaneously after
the state is chosen by Nature. An action is a couple (p; a) constituted by a price
and a level of xed cost advertising, a, with a  0. First, it is useful to state the
following result.
Lemma 1: Independently of the consumers' system of beliefs, at a separating
equilibrium of the game rm L in the state (H,L) plays L = (
^
pL; 0).
Proof: see Appendix 1.
Obviously this result greatly simplies the analysis. The strategy played by rm
L in state (L,H) is, in the duopoly example here considered,
^
pL= pH=2 and zero
advertising, or, in our notation, L =

pH
2
; 0

.
Let us analyze the implications of condition (A) for our duopoly example.
If rm L imitates the price and advertising  used by rm H then consumers
will form beliefs b(H j H). It is then crucial to determine the role of b(H j H)
for the characterization of the separating strategies and to choose the value for
it that does not interfere with the results.
First, given b(H j H), then the consumer's utility from buying when both
rms use the same strategy is given by b(H j H)uH + (1  b(H j H))uL; that
is, shortening the notation, b(v +m  p) + (1   b)(v   p). This implies that the
consumer indierent between buying and not buying is mb = (p  v)=b. So that
total demand is Db = 1 + v=b  p=b if p > v and it is Db = 1 if p < v11.
Second, going back to condition A (no-jamming), for a couple of price and
advertising (pH ; a), used by rm H , if pH < v , then all consumers buy one
unit, and demand to each rm is 1/2, so that if it plays H rm L has prot
L(H; H; b(H j H)) =
pH
2
 a. If it plays
^
pL (pH) =
pH
2
(and zero advertising)
it makes prot L(L j H; 0) =

pH
2
2
. In the case pH < v, then the value of pH
and of a that satisfy condition A must satisfy
pH
2
  a 

pH
2
2
; (3.6)
Note that for pH > v condition A does not write as in (3.6) above, because
demand is not inelastic to price as not all consumers necessarily buy. The L.H.S.
11Note that the demand Db corresponds to demand DH of Section 2, when b = 1, and to DL
when b = 0. While its elastic part rotates downward as b is decreased form 1 to zero.
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term is then equal toDb 
pH
2
 a , where b represents the beliefs held by consumers.
Then for pH > v the condition writes as
(1 +
v   pH
b
)
pH
2
  a 

pH
2
2
(3.7)
Conditions (3.6) and (3.7) when combined dene a continuous function a(pH),
which is concave shaped and it has a kink in correspondence of pH = v, as depicted
in Figure 3. The graph of the function to the right of v is shifted, with its pivot
in the point with coordinates (v; a(v)), in the right direction as b increases from
0 to 1. For b = 0 it coincides with the horizontal axis12, in fact, pb = v for b = 0
and pb > v for b > 0.
The function a(pH) delimits the lower bound for a in a separating strategy
H for any given level of pH .
Third, and nally, note that the range of prices for which a high price and
no advertising strategy can separate is the interval of prices at the right of the
intersection of the curve a(pH) with the price axis. Since this intersection moves
rightward as b(H j H) is increased, the range of prices that can separate without
advertising is larger the lower is the value of b(H j H). To get the desired result,
therefore we shall set b(H j H) = 0 so as to "consider the less favorable case for
the necessity of advertising".
Assumption 2: b(H j H) = 0:
Note that under this assumption the function a(pH) depends on the value of
b(H j H) only if v < 2, in which case it look as in the right graph depicted
in Figure 3, in the opposite case in fact there is no kink and a(pH) = (pH=2)  
(pH=2)2, as depicted in Figure 4 below.
A rst condition for a price-alone strategy to work as a signal is that the price
is higher than v (and in particular higher than pb if violating Assumption 2 one
had b > 0). Notice incidentally that such a price may be higher than the full
information price, in particular it must be higher than that price if v > pH =
2(1 + c)=3.
Simply looking at Figure 3 it is clear that if v is larger than 2 then a price-
alone strategy implies pH > 2 and therefore it yields zero demand to rm H.
Then we can state
12Formally, let as(pH) =
pH
2
 
pH
2
2
, for pH < v , and let ab(pH) = pH
 
b+v
2b

+ p2H
 
2+b
4b

for pH 2 [v; pb], where pb = (2b+2v)=(2+ b) is the highest root of ab(pH). Then, recalling that
dH = 0 for pH  2,
a(pH) = as(pH) if pH < v;
a(pH) = ab(pH); if pH 2 [v; pb];
and a(pH) = 0 if p > pb.
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Proposition 2: If v > 2 then no strategy with zero advertising can achieve
separation.
In fact if v > 2 the only prices that can signal rm H in the state (H,L) are
higher than 2, but then this rm receives zero demand as stated in Subsection
3.1 above, and the equilibrium. The fact that a high value of v destroys the
equilibria where price-alone strategies are used can be interpreted economically.
We leave this discussion however for the concluding Section.
It is now possible to ask whether with v > 2 advertising can separate where
price-alone strategies cannot. Let us turn now for this purpose to the implications
of condition (B).
Note that when rm L plays according to its best reply,
^
pL= pH=2; then the
demand to rm H under full information is given by
dH(pH ;
^
pL) = 1  pH=2: (3.8)
so that
H(H j L; 1) = (1   pH=2)pH :
Note to start that the demand to rm H (and to rm L) in state (H,L) if H plays
the same strategy as rm L, should in general be determined by the beliefs held
by consumers when the couple (L; L) is observed. However, in the case here
analyzed the matter is simplied by Lemma 1: since L plays according to its full
information best response to pH , it is never the case that pL > v. If both rms
play pL, therefore, all consumers buy even if they think that the state is (L,L),
so that the market is entirely covered for any belief b(L j L). Therefore, again,
beliefs are irrelevant here, and the tie is broken as it is customary by assuming
that demand is split in equal parts13.
Condition (B) describes a function, A(pH), that denes the maximal amounts
of advertising consistent with separation. This function looks generically as a
quasi-concave function with a kink at the point where pH = 2c, (see discussion
13In a model where DL(p) has no vertical sections, but it is downward sloping wherever it is
positive valued, then the assumption that b(L; L) = 0 would play the role that the assumption
b(H ; H) = 0 plays for condition (A). The calculations would only become less straightforward
while the main conclusions would not be altered.
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of Figure 4 below) and it is dened by14
A(pH) = (pH   c)

1 
pH
2

= ay(pH); (3.10)
for pH < 2c, and by
A(pH) = (pH   c)

1 
pH
2

 
1
2

pH
2
  c

= az(pH ); (3.11)
for pH > 2c.
Note that az = ay at pH = 2c so that A(pH) is continuous15. Furthermore 2c
is also a maximum of A(pH) if pH > 0:5. While for c < 0:5 the maximum is at
the right of pH = 2c and it coincides with the maximum of az(pH).
The interplay of the curves a(pH) and A(pH) determines the regions in the
space of (pH ; a) couples to which the separating strategy H; in state (H,L) or
(L,H), must necessarily belong if a separating equilibrium of the game exists.
Note, to start, that if v < 2 strategies involving a zero amount of advertising
and that satisfy the constraint derived by condition (A) always exist. If and
only if A(pH) intersects the horizontal axis to the right of v16, however, there are
price-alone strategies that also satisfy constraint (B).
For the purposes of the present Section|namely to demonstrate that the
possibility of advertising enlarges the set of parameter ranges for which separation
may occur over and above the range for which separation may obtain through
prices only|it is sucient to show that, when v > min fz(c); 2g, there exist
ranges for the cost parameter c for which a strategy H with strictly positive
advertising satises necessary conditions (A) and (B).
Proposition 3. For c < 1 and v > min fz(c); 2g the only non-trivial separating
equilibria that may exist involve a strictly positive level of advertising in the states
(L,H) and (H,L). Furthermore, for c<1/2 the high quality rm has a strictly
positive prot, while for c1/2 its prots are null but its market share positive.
14The prot to rm H if the equilibrium strategies are played is
(p  c)dH(pH ; pH=2)  a = (p  c)(1  pH=2)  a:
Then condition B writes as
(pH   c)

1  pH
2

  a  max

1
2
pH
2
  c

; 0

: (3.9)
The right hand term is zero if pH < 2c, that is when rm H would make negative prots if
it deviated to the price of its rival, but just needs to make non-negative prots.
15The function A coincides with the Min[az; ay] over the relevant range and so it can be
more easily retained.
16The condition is that the largest root of az(pH), denoted z(c) = 14 (3 + 2c+
p
9  4c+ c2)
is larger than v.(Note that for all c > 0, z(c) > c and that the roots of ay(c) are c and 2).
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As an informal proof for the case c < 0:5 consider the graph represented in the
left part of Figure 4, which has been drawn for a value of v > 2, and of c = 0:25:
the curve a(p) is recognized as starting from the origin, and A(p) starts from the
point c, where ay(pH) = 0. The two constraints there cross at the point where
pH = 2c, and at the point where pH = 1. It can be shown that for c < 1=2 these
crossings occur in the same way as depicted in that graph17, i.e. one has that for
pH in the range [2c; 1] the inequality A(p) > a holds, while outside that range the
opposite inequality holds (the right hand graph in Figure 4 has been drawn for a
value of c = 0, the valid region shrinks in size as c is increased form zero to 0.5).
It follows that in general, for c < 1=2, the region to which a separating strategy
H must belong is formed by (i) a non-empty region where advertising is strictly
positive; (ii) a (possibly empty) region consisting of all points on the abscissa
lying in the interval [v; z(c)]. This proves the rst part of the Proposition.
(To prove the part of the proposition regarding the case c > 1=2 consider Figure
5, which has been drawn under the hypothesis that c = 0:7. It is apparent
from Figure 5 that if v > 2, then a separating equilibrium if it exists is given
by the point of tangency of A(pH) and a(pH). The same situation arises for all
values of c  0:5, because for these values one can easily check that A(pH) has
a unique maximum at the point where pH = 2c, and that at pH = 2c one has
a(pH) = A(pH), so that the equilibrium H is unique in these cases18). 2
We will nally note that a price couple equal to the full information prices
for the high and low quality may be used at a separating equilibrium if the high
quality rm accompanies the full information price by an adequate expenditure
in advertising. For instance, for c = 0:25 one has that pH = 5=6 and a = as(5=6)
may constitute a separating strategy H for H.
The important feature of the results so far obtained is that they, in the same
line as for the monopoly case, establish a characterization of equilibria, preceding
a complete specication of beliefs.
Existence is discussed in Appendix 2.
3.4. Persistence
As it is clear, the plausibility that advertising must be used in a one-shot set-up,
implies that it can be used also in situations where repeat purchase is not present.
For instance in the case of the restaurants quoted in the Introduction. The
luxurious setting of one of two restaurants can be interpreted as an ostentation
17In particular, pH = 2c is the point where as; ay; az; all cross; pH = 1 is always one of the
roots of the equation as = az, and it is the largest root for c < 1=2.
18When c = 1 then 2c = 2 and the point of tangency of the two constraints implies that
pH = 2. For c > 1 the two constraints do not touch any more since A(pH) < 0 for c > 1, so
that the separating equilibria with advertising do not exist for these values of c.
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of "waste" that persists over time as it must signal to new consumers at each
period. Similarly, the repetition of promotion campaigns on television by some
brands may have the same function. Furthermore, as it shall be shown below
persistence can occur when renown brands may be induced to advertise in order
to deter the entry of other rms.
4. Advertising as an Entry Barrier
Assume there is a third rm in addition to the two previously considered. This
rm is a producer of lowest quality, in the sense that it can be one of two types:
L or 0, but not of type H. If a buyer purchases the good 0 at price p0 she gets a
utility u0 =  p0. To simplify matters assume that a op can never be mistaken
for a high quality product, but it is indistinguishable from a low quality product,
an assumption that could be relaxed in a more complete version of this game.
To keep with the approach of short term interaction, we assume that the
entry, price, and advertising decisions are all simultaneously taken. If we had
assumed repeat purchase, and a multi-period framework, it would be possible to
modify the example here in order to consider the behavior of incumbents against
potential entrants.
In this game it is common knowledge that there can be such a producer,
called a "yer-by-the-night", in the sense that everybody knows that if three
rms are on the market one could be a op and must leave the market after
having deceived consumers once. We shall concentrate on the asymmetric states
(H,L,0) and those obtained permuting the order of the entries. Since quality H
cannot by hypothesis be imitated by the op, in these states the op must imitate
the low quality if it wants to enter. Then if the state (H,L,0) realizes rm L has
to prevent the op from entering19.
If the type 0 rm enters and replicates the strategy of rm L then consumers
cannot distinguish which rm is L and which is the op. Firm H, by contrast
may separate from rm L using a strategy that can be described analogously to
what has been done above so as to prevent rm L from imitating|for brevity we
do not re-state the conditions (A) and (B) for this game.
Note that if the op enters and imitates rm L, then this rm and the op
are both believed to be ops with probability 0.5 and will share the demand
addressed to the corresponding expected quality as it shall be briey shown.
The consumers know that there is at most one op, hence their expected utility
from buying from one of the two rms that uses the strategy L = (pL; aL) is
19Under the assumption that a high quality cannot be mistaken with a op, when the state
is (H,H,0) the yer{by-the-night cannot enter. If the state is (L,L,0), under revelation one
would observe advertising from both low quality rms, as it is briey explained in the following
footnote. Finally, if the state is (L,L,L) all rms play the Bertrand equilibrium with a price
equal to marginal cost (here zero) and no advertising.
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uf = 0:5[v   pL]. The consumer indierent from either rm playing L and rm
H is m = pH   pL   (0:5)v. The total demand addressed to the two rms L and
0 is therefore equal to m.
Assume then that at state (L,H,0) rm L must deter the op with a (sepa-
rating) strategy L = (pL; aL). A necessary condition for this strategy to deter
the yer-by-the-night is that if this enters and plays exactly L it makes a loss.
The no-jamming constraint preventing a op from entering and imitate rm
L is:
pL
2
(pH   pL  
v
2
)  aL  0: (4.1)
The R.H.S. in the inequality above is justied by the fact that the full infor-
mation price and prot of a op is zero. The L.H.S. is simply the prot of a op
that enters and imitates a rm of type L that is playing (pL; aL) against a rm
H that is playing (pH ; aH).
If aL = 0 the yer-by-the-night always nds it protable to enter so that
advertising is necessary for rm L to keep the op out20. Obviously, a necessary
condition for the low quality rm to separate from the op through advertising is
that by so doing it makes a prot higher than if it accommodates the entry of the
yer-by-the-night. The rm L prot after accommodation is
pL
2
(pH   pL  
v
2
).
And the price pL that maximizes this prot is equal to p`  (1=2)(pH   v=2). A
deviation from the entry preventing price pL that belongs to L = (pL; aL), to p`
entails a prot equal to (1=4)(pH v=2)2. Therefore a condition that L = (pL; aL)
must satisfy is that
pL(pH   pL)  aL > (1=4)(pH   v=2)
2: (4.2)
Finally, the behavior of rm H must assure that rm L does not want to
imitate rm H in a duopoly, i.e. that pL(pH   pL)  aH > pL(pH   pL)  aL(this
again is the no-jamming condition).
The lesson from this second example is that the theory here exposed can ac-
count for (i) low quality rms advertising together with high quality rms, (2)
persistence of both rms advertising over time.
Note that the existence region for high-price and no advertising for rm H
shrinks further if the low quality rm advertises. In fact the L.H.S. of all con-
ditions (A) and (B) is lowered by the xed amount aL, so that the incentive
constraint az(p) is shifted upward, and the range of v-values that are larger than
the root zc shrinks accordingly as aL is increased.
20When the state is (L,L,0) the two rms of type L can deter the entry of the third rm by
using a price-advertising couple (pLL; aLL) satisfying the no-jamming condition pLL
1
3
 aLL  0;
which ensures that entry is not protable. The two type L rms make nonnegative prots
provided pLL
1
2
  aLL  0. Clearly, there are many such couples (pLL; aLL), one example is
(pLL; aLL) = (v;
v
3
), at which both rms make zero prots.
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Finally, assume that the market size increases or decreases over time as in a
cyclical behavior of demand. For instance assume that the mass of consumers is
Mt where the subscript t denotes a date. If advertising is used as an entry barrier,
then it persists; however it must also vary according to demand conditions: the
no-jamming constraint preventing a op to enter and imitate rm L becomes:
pL
2
(pH   pL  
v
2
)Mt  aL: (4.3)
As Mt varies along the cycle so varies the minimum amount of advertising of
rm L.
As a conclusion we get that advertising varies pro-cyclically.
5. Concluding remarks on advertising, signaling, and price
policy
When advertising is used as an entry barrier, since in that case it is clear that
a price-alone strategy can always be mimicked by an entrant of lower quality, it
arises as a natural equilibrium behavior. When it is just used by a high quality to
separate from a low quality its relative merits over a price-alone strategy should
be intuitively explained as they seem to apply for the duopoly and not for the
monopoly case.
Note rst that to obtain separation when one rm is of high quality and the
other is of low quality the former must discourage imitation by visibly wasting
some resources. This can be done by an abnormal increase (for the case of a
decrease in price see comments below) in price, or by adding the xed costs of an
advertising campaign. A high price, however is painful in terms of lost customers
that switch to the rival supplier. This eect is larger the more elastic is the
rm's demand to the price dierence. For high enough prices if quality does
not command a high premium the high quality is out of the market and cannot
separate. The quality premium for rm H in our model is higher (in percentage
terms) the lower is the parameter v. A high v induces a low percentage dierence
in utility (uH   uL)=uL = (m  pH + pL)=(v  pL). This accounts in part for the
diculty to obtain separation through a high price and no advertising when v is
high. By using advertising and an appropriate price together, the high quality
rm may succeed in discouraging imitation without raising its price too much
above that of the rival.
Second, the price of the low quality rm at a separating equilibrium is a
decreasing function of the price of the high quality rm (in monopoly this is not
so). This means that the lower the price that is used by the latter for separation,
the lower the margins that it can enjoy by imitating the low quality rm. This
makes it easier for the high quality to be discouraged from mimicking the low
quality. Also in this respect the use of advertising, since it allows a reduction in
the signaling price of the high quality rm renders the separation easier.
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More generally, the importance of a low price in a competitive framework
is quite obvious, while it is not so in the context of a monopoly. By focussing
on the single-rm problem some authors have stressed the importance of low
introductory prices as a signaling policy (see Schmalensee[1978]), while others
have attributed more importance to high-price policies as signaling devices (see
Bagwell and Riordan[1991]). The explanation we use here does not conict with
either those views of low (or of high) introductory prices as signals, although
we stress the importance of advertising components of a signaling strategy that
allow a price policy to be a signal21. In our example a price higher than the
full information price|when revelation is spontaneous the full information price
itself|may signal without advertising. But there are situations where advertising
is necessary for prices higher than, equal to, or lower than the full information
price to separate.
The old idea that the entry of new rms may be deterred through advertising
nds its counterpart in our model in the idea that signaling through advertising
allows a lower price than signaling through price alone and reduces the market
share for the rivals. The low quality rm by advertising can use a price low
enough to discourage entry of a rm with a still lower quality, while without
advertising the same price cannot deter the entrants.
This type of advertising is most likely to continue over time and to vary in
a pro-cyclical fashion, as it is directed not so much to separate one incumbent
from another incumbent but to discourage, through time, the mimicking from
potential entrants.
21The signaling role of prices is also the focus of Wolinski [1983] and Cooper and Ross [1984].
In these works, however, some consumers are informed about product qualities or can acquire
information at a cost (i.e. the product is a search good). The question there studied is then the
extent to which equilibrium prices transmit information from informed to uninformed agents.
It is high prices that have received the most attention in those works.
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6. Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Suppose that (p; a) satises both (i) and (ii). Suppose further that
(p; 0) does not satisfy either one or both (i) and (ii). Since (p; a) satises (ii)
(1 + v   p)(p  c)  a  v + c  0 then, a fortiori (1 + v   p)(p  c)  v + c  0.
The lowest value of a that can be associated to p is therefore given by (i) and
is (1 + v   p)p   v  a+. Then, assume  = (p; a+) . By continuity of the
function (1 + v   p)p there exists a price p0 > p such that (1 + v   p0)p0 = v.
Hence assume the strategy 0 = (p0; 0), which veries constraint (i), is used
instead of . Constraint (ii) for 0 writes as (1 + v   p0)(p0   c)   v + c 
0. Since  satises (ii), for this inequality to be veried, it is sucient that
(1 + v   p0)(p0   c)  v + c  (1 + v   p)(p  c)  v + c  a+. But this writes as
(1+v p0)p0 c(1+v p0) v   (1+v p)c or (1+v p0)  (1+v p), which
is true since p0 > p and since both expressions in parentheses are non-negative.
The argument applies also for all strategies (p,a) with a > v+ and it is therefore
complete. 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof: Suppose that at an equilibrium rm L plays an action 0
dierent from L when the state is (H,L). By denition of a Separating
Equilibrium rm L is perceived as L and its opponent as H. However,
by deviating to strategy L, if it is still perceived as L with probability
one it will play according to its best reply against H, and if it is
perceived as L with probability less than one, it will receive a higher
demand than if it is with probability one, and its prot will increase,
therefore, in either case there is no strategy available to rm L that
dominates L: 2
7. Appendix 2: Existence
The necessary conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium are suf-
cient to characterize the nature of the signal used, but are not sucient to
guarantee existence in general. Recall furthermore that the analysis has been so
far concerned only with the actions prescribed in states (H,L) and (L,H), and the
other actions have been left unspecied.
The present Section lls this gap and shows that existence is guaranteed, in
one of the simplest belief systems that can be envisaged, if only an additional
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condition is imposed upon H . Of course the equilibria here found satisfy (as all
equilibria must) the characterization in Section 3 above based upon conditions
(A) and (B). To eliminate the inuence of the value taken by b(H j H) upon
the result that advertising may be necessary, we assume that b(H j H) = 0,
so as to render as large as possible the set of situations in which a price alone
strategy of the type H = (p; 0) can work as a signal.
Assume that consumers beliefs have the following structure. (i) If they ob-
serve that no rm uses advertising and that prices are equal to c at both rms
consumers believe that the state is (H,H). (ii) If only one rm plays H and if
this satises (A) and (B) above, then they believe that this rm is H and the
other is L, unless the other rm also plays either H, or (0; 0) in which case they
believe that state is (L,L). (iii) Any other strategy couple dierent from those
contemplated by (i) and (ii) induces the belief that the state is (L,L).
Formally:
(i) (bi(i j j); bj(i j j)) = (1; 1) if (i; j) = ((c; 0); (c; 0));
(ii) (bi(i j j); bj(i j j)) = (1; 0) if (i; j) = (H ; x) with
x =2 fH ; (0; 0)g and with H satisfying conditions (A) and (B);
(iii) (bi(i j j); bj(i j j)) = (0; 0) otherwise.
Note that (iii) encompasses the symmetric couple (H; H) so that these
beliefs imply that condition (A) is written with b(H; H) = 0.
It must be shown now that the equilibrium strategy prescribe that: if the
state is (L,L) then i and j are (0; 0) at each rm; If the state is (H,L) they
are H = (pH ; a) by rm H and L = (pH=2; 0) by rm L, with H satisfying
condition 3.2 , 3.3 and a condition that shall be dened below; nally, if the state
is (H,H) they are (c; 0) by each rm.
First, if the state is (H,L) or (L,H) the strategies played must be H, and
(pH=2; 0) respectively. The best deviations from equilibrium under the assumed
system of beiefs are H for rm L and (pH=2; 0) for rm H. But these deviations
cannot be protable since H satises conditions (A) and (B) above. This couple
of actions is therefore a couple of mutual best replies.
Second, if the state is (L,L) then the play of a null price and of no advertising
by both rms must constitute a couple of best replies: if a rm deviates to any
other strategy with a positive price it shall still be perceived as L, therefore it
cannot increase its prot above zero. Therefore the couple ((0; 0); (0; 0)) is a
couple of mutual best replies.
It remains to be veried whether under the state (H,H) the candidate that the
beliefs propose, namely the couple ((c; 0); (c; 0)) is a pair of mutual best replies.
It is immediate to see that the only possible deviation left to either rm by the
beliefs is the play of strategy H instead of (c; 0). That deviation generates an
observation of the kind listed in (ii) in the belief system, and therefore aords
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the deviating rm with a demand and a prot pertaining to a high quality rm
that confronts a low quality opponent quoting price c. This prot is (pH   c)(1+
c  pH)  a. Therefore since the play of the equilibrium recommendation implies
a null prot to both rms, the condition for no deviation to H writes as
(pH   c)(1 + c  pH)  a  0: (7.1)
It follows that a separating equilibrium exists if the three conditions (A), (B)
and (7.1) are met by H.
Note for further reference that the crossing of (7.1) and of a(p) occurs exactly
for a value of pH = 2(1 + c)=3  pH , the full information price for rm H.
Therefore the full information price may be used as a signal if coupled with an
advertising campaign costing a(pH). In fact also some slightly lower prices may
belong to the admissible region for H. Recalling form Proposition 2 that when
c < 1=2 the region for which signaling with a positive advertising exists is non-
empty and it implies a price in [2c; 1], one can easily check that condition (7.1)
is satised for some couples (pH ; a) when pH 2 [2c; 1], namely when c < 2.
The issue of existence is therefore resolved.
One may note, to complete the discussion, that there can exist many (in
general an innite number of) equilibria when the regions as described in the
preceding paragraph are non-empty. While we do not address here the issue
of selecting among equilibria, it is interesting to note that solely based on the
characterization of equilibria, one can conclude that in some cases equilibria
without advertising do not exist.
Of course, like in the case of a monopoly, one can construct belief systems
that sustain only pooling equilibria, but since the focus here is on separation and
not on the issue of pooling versus separation we do not pursue a detailed analysis
here.
The system of beliefs in (i) - (iii) shares a feature that is most general in games
with two signal senders, namely that beliefs depend upon what both players do,
or, in short, beliefs are "correlated".
It is possible to generate separating equilibria of this game also by using
systems with "uncorrelated" beliefs. For instance, beliefs of this type assign
probability one of being H to any rm playing a strategy that satises some
conditions (in particular (A) and (B)), whatever the other player does. Obviously
this implies that the observation of a strategy couple like (H ; H) implies belief
b(H j H) = 1. This is valid only if ! comprises the state (H,H). It is possible
to show that there exist systems of non correlated beliefs sustaining separating
equilibria.
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